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CHAPTER 8 
Consumer Protection 
§8.I. IntrcXluction. During the 1969 SURVEY year, two very im-
portant and extremely significant items of consumer protection became 
law in the Commonwealth. 'Effective November 13, 1969, Chapter 
600 of the Acts of 1969 (entitled "An Act providing civil remedies to 
a person injUred' by any act or practice declared unfair or deceptive 
by the Consumer Protection Act") allows consumers, both individually 
and as a class; t& institute actions for multiple damages and/or equi-
table relief where unfair or deceptive practices have been employed. 
Chapter 690 adds Sections 9 and 10 to Chapter 9SA of the General 
Laws. 
Effective 18 days after Chapter 690, Chapter 814 of the Acts of 1969 
(entitled "An Act amending the Consumer Protection Act and pro-
viding restitution to a consumer who has suffered loss due to a decep-
tive act ar 'practice"), also amends Chapter 9SA of the General Laws. 
It adds four new sections - Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 - and amends Sec-
tions' I and 8(2). The new sections grant authority to the attomey 
general to file suits or pursue other action to protect injured con-
sumers. 
The two acts are complementary. Under Chapter 690, permanent 
injunctions or court orders which are granted under Chapter 814 are 
prima facie evidence of unfair or deceptive acts or practices when 
alleged in litigation commenced under Chapter 690. The two acts 
were the first such state acts in the United States. Since their enact-
ment North Carolina has enacted a similar statute.1 Both the North 
Carolina and the Massachusetts acts provide broad, comprehensive 
consumer protection, something 101)g needed to balance the weight 
of caveat emptor. 
A. SCOPE AND COVERAGE 
§8.2. Scope and coverage of actions under G.L, c. 93A. Although 
no actions have as yet been initiated under Chapter 9SA1 of the Gen-
eral Laws [hereinafter the Act], it would seem certain that any and 
all legal entities are subject to action thereunder. Section l(a) of the 
Thill' chapter was written by MARC A. COMItAS, a student at Boston College Law 
School and a staff assistant at the National Consumer Law Center. He was assisted 
by the personnel of the National Consumer Law Center in preparing this chapter. 
§8.l. 1 N.C. Gen. Stat. §O·O (1969). 
§8.2. 1 G.L. c. 9SA. is known as the Massachusetts deceptive practices act. 
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Act defines a "person" subject to its coverage as including: natural 
persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships and any other legal e .. tity. 
The catchall phrase, "any other legal entity," would seem to assure 
broad and complete applicability. 
As to the scope of the coverage of the Act, Section 2(a) declares 
that unfair methods of competition and unfak or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce, as defined in Sec-
tion l(b), are unlawful. Section 2(b) s~~es the, .legislative intent be-
hind the Act. The General Cotp"tspecifica1ly requirec:l. the 'C9urts in 
construing the Act to be guided by federal court w,dsions; and. by 
the interpretations of the Federal Trade. CommissiQn, in construing 
Section 5(a)(I) of the Federal Trade Commission ,Act.' Various prac-
tices have been declared to be unlawful. Among. them ~ "commer-
cial" bribery;8 payola;4 coercion Q1" in~dation of A:Uswmen;1i scare 
tactics to make sales;8 threatening to jnitiat~ collection suits;T 8!BJes 
or payments wrongfully forced;8 damaging or, withhc>lding custo~en' 
property;9 lotteries or lottery devices in sales;10 failure to fill QrClers 
promptly;l1 shipment of unordered goods;I'~d, .substitution of 
goods.18 Disclosure has been required where t4ere is a change in. a 
product;14 d~ceptive appearance as to compPJition;lli. danger in the 
use of a product;18 foreign origin of a product;IT . imperfect and re-
jected goods;18 a limited number of products available;19 and' old, 
used, or second-hand goods.2.0 RepresentatiollJ as to financial standing, 
, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(I). , 
8 American Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F .2d 582 (7th Cir. 1959). 
4 FTC Dockets 7825·7829, 7894·7902. 
II Stokely·Van Camp, Inc:. v. FTC, 246 F.2d 458 (7lb Cir. 1957). 
8 FTC Dockets 6489 and 6712 (c:onc:emmg fire alariI:i$)l FTC Dockets 8851-8852 
(garbage disposals): FTC Docket 6827 (shampoo); and· Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 
295 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1961) (fumac:es) •. 
T Dorfman v. FTC, 144 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1944) (rug sales). 
'8 See Holland, note 6 supra. 
9 FTC Dockets 5011, 4951 and 6101. 
10 FTC v. R'. F. K.eppell: Brother, Inc., 291 U.s. 504 (1954) (candy): ChicagoSJlk 
Co. v. FTC,90 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 502 U.s. 755 (1957) (punch-
boards used for nylon stocking sales). 
11 FTC Dockets 6116 (air-conditioners and television sets), 6678 (books), and 5566 
and 6006 (magazines). 
12 Consumers. Hom.; Equipment. Co. v.FTC, 164 F.2d,972 (6th Cir. 1947). 
18 -rro v. AJaoma Lumber Co., 291 U.s. 67 (19114) (lumber);. ~ational Trade Pub-
lications Service, Inc. v. FTC,5OO 1!'.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1962) (magUines). 
14 Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F.744 (2dCir. 1922). 
IIiDelaware Watch Co. T. FTC. 532 F.2d 745(2d Cir. 1964) (watches); Haskeltte 
Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942) (paper trays). 
16American Medicinal Products, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d ~(i (9th Cir. 1945) (drugs); 
Ultra-Violet J!roducts, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F.2d 814'(9thClr. 1944). 
ITWalthaPl.Watdl~. v. FTC, 1I18 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1965). 
18 FTC Docket 7904 (television tubes). 
19 See "Guides Against Bait Advertising," 16 C.F .R. §258. 
2.0 K.erran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959): Standard Distributors, Inc. v. FTC, 
211 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1954). ~ . 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/11
§8.2 CONSUMER PROTECI'ION 159 
reputation and time in business have been held unlawful practices21 
as have those concerning business nature and trade status'.!2 and af-
filiations and connections when such do not in truth exist.23 Also 
unlawful are claims of disabiIity;24 government endorsements;215 com-
parisions;26 guarantees without disclosure of the nature and extent 
of the guarantee;27 and therapeutic claims.28 
With the above practices as examples, although by no means ex-
clusive, it is obvious that many unlawful acts take place and that 
many very common acts are unlawful. That the courts have found 
so many to be illegal is perhaps surprising, but this lends support 
to an optimistic outlook concerning the Massachusetts courts future 
application of the Act. 
Section 2(c) of the Act provides that rules and regulations be pro-
mulgated by the attorney general which are to be used in interpreting 
the Act. These rules and regulations must be consistent with the 
rules, regulations and decisions of the federal courts and Federal 
Trade Commission, which interprets the provisions of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. Pursuant to the legislative command in Sec-
tion 2(c), the attorney general has promulgated rules and regulations 
interpreting the Act.29 In addition to overlapping some of the matters 
covered by the federal courts and the Federal Trade Commission as 
previously listed, the attorney general has dealt with such areas as 
false advertising, deceptive pricing, general misrepresentations and 
referral schemes. 
Although comprehensive, the Act does not cover all consumer 
transactions. Section 3 of the Act specifically exempts certain trans-
actions. For example, transactions which are otherwise permitted 
under law as administered by any regulatory board or office, acting 
under the authority of the Commonwealth or of the United States is 
exempted under Section 3(1)(a). Trade or commerce, as defined in 
Section I (b), by any person whose gross revenue consists of at least 
20 percent derived from transactions in interstate commerce is ex-
empted from coverage with two very important exceptions: (1) trans-
actions and actions which occur primarily and substantially within 
the Commonwealth,80 and (2) where the attorney general has notified 
21 U.S. Retail Credit Assn. v. FTC, SOS F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1962). 
22 FTC v. Kelly, 87 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 19S7) (unfair to represent seller as manufac-
turer where he was not). 
28 Lane v. FTC, IllO F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1942); Park, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc. 
v. FTC, 142 F.2d 4117 (2d Cir. 1944). 
24 Better Living, Inc. v. FTC, 259 F.2d 271 (lid Cir. 1958) (aluminum); Continental 
Wax Corp. v. FTC, 1l1l0 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964) (wax protection). 
215 United States Navy Weekly, Inc. v. FTC, 207 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 19511). 
2G National Bakers Services, Inc. v. FTC, 1129 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1964). 
27 Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 8118 (7th Cir. 1961). 
28 Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc. v. FTC, 187 F.2d 6911 (7th Cir. 1951); Bristol.Meyers 
Co. v. FTC, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950); Sebrone Co. v. FTC, 1115 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 
1945.) 
29 Atty. Gen. Rules and Regs. - (1969). 
so G.L., c. 9SA, §S(I)(b)(i). 
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the, Fed~ral Trade Com~ission, and the "merchant" of an alleged 
viQla.qon and of his intention to act, and the attorney general has 
not received written notification of tlle Federal Trade Commission's 
rece~pt of Pte notification.81 The transactions or actions of any person 
wJto show, that he has been served with a co~plaint by the Federal 
Trade Commission with regard to the same alleged violation as raised 
by the at~orney general are exempted from coverage of the Act until 
~~po .. tWn of the case by the Federal Trade Commission. The ex-
empqon ,contin1,les until the FTC (J) dismisses the complaint, (2) 
~cufes llJl assurance of voluntary compliance, or (S) issues a cease 
~d ~si.t order pursuant to 15:U.s.C. §45(b). When anyone of these 
three dispositions are made, the attorney general may procee<J under 
tlJ,e Act. 
Of ~at significapce in the application of the Act is the legislative 
placement of the burden of proof. Thus for apy respondent to claim 
lU1 exemption under the Act for any reason, he must prove that he 
falls w:ithin one of the exempted categories. If he fails to so prove, he 
is covered by the Act.82 
B. PlUVATE REMEDIES 
§S.ll. Ipdividual and class actions. Section 9 of the Act provides 
the statutory basis for private, suits. Section ~(l) apr.lies to any person 
who purchases or leases goods or services for primanly personal, family 
or household purposes. If such person suffers any loss of money or 
property (real or personal) as a result of the use or employment of an 
Unfair or deceptive act or practice1 in any aspect of a purchase or lease 
transaction, he may l»ing an action in the superior court. The suit 
is brought in equity, and may request damages2 in addition to any 
equitable relief which the court deems necessary and proper. 
Sectioq, 9(2) of the Act allows any person entitled to bring an action 
under Section 9(1) to bring that action as a class action if the alleged 
unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to nu-
merous other persons under similar circumstances. If grounds for a 
class ac;tion are alleged, a preliminary hearing must be scheduled in 
order to decide whether or not the party or parties bringing the action 
have adequately and fairly represented the interests of the other 
persons similarly situated. Once the representatives of the class are 
certified by the court sitting at the preliminary hearing, the court will 
order that notice of the pending action be given to the unnamed 
petitioners in the most effective manner practicable. It is important 
to note that the court may require that the petitioner send written 
81 G.L., c. 911A, §1I6(1)(b)(ii). 
82 ~.~., C. 911A, §1I(c)(2). 
§IU: 1 A~ defined by G.L., c. 911A, §2, or by any rule or regulation issued, and 
§2(c), as noted in §8.2 supra. 
2 See §8.5 infra. 
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nOtice to each unnamed petitioner. If this is nOt practicable, mothet 
method may be devised upon court approval. AlSo, the adequate 
representation requirement may be restrictively interpreted to include 
substantially similar or identical interests in the initial transaction or 
in the relief sought. For example, a restrictive interpretation may not 
allow petitioners to seek both money damages and injunctive relief in 
the same suit. Thus, care must be taken before commencing a class 
action under Chapter 93A. If such an action will restrict one's relief; 
it should be avoided, or at least commenced with a realization of the 
dangers involved. However, due to the broad and inclusive wording 
of Section 9(1), this caveat will most likely prove to be unnecessary. 
§8.4. Procedural considerations. The basis or grounds for action 
under the Act is an injury to a consumer caused by the use of unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices1 in a purchase or lease transaction· for 
goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 
Once a determination has been made that grounds exist under Sec-
tions 2 and 3,2 the practitioner must then tum to Section 9(3) for the 
procedural steps. The first is the written demand for relief.8 At least 
30 days before the petitioner claimant intends to file suit for damages 
or injunctive relief,' it is required that he mail or deliver to the 
prospective respondent a written demand letter for the relief he is 
seeking. II Such a demand letter must be mailed or delivered to any and 
every prospective respondent. If mailed, the letter should be sent 
registered mail, return receipt requested. It should be carefully 
addressed to the appropriate corporate officer, if respondent is a cor-
poration, or to the legally responsible individual if respondent is not 
a corporation. The demand letter must identify the Claimant and must 
reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon 
as a basis for the claim, as well as the injury suffered. The petitioner 
claimant should state in the demand letter that the transaction in. 
volved was a purchase or lease of goods or services (as applicable) and 
that the transaction was primarily for either personal, family, or 
household purposes. If petitioner claimant is contemplating a class 
action, he should include in the demand letter information that, to his 
knowledge, the act or practice of which he is complaining has been 
used to the detriment of others. 
Any prospective respondent, upon receiving a demand for relief may, 
within 30 days of receipt of that demand, make a written tender of 
settlement.S If this tender is refused, the prospective respondent may 
file the written tender and an affidavit concerning the transaction for 
which relief was demanded. If the court finds that the settlement tender 
§8.4. 1 As defined by G.L., c. 93A, §§2 and 8. 
2 See §8.2 supra. 
8 See Appendix I at the end of this chapter for sample letter. 
'G.L., c. 93A, §9(1). 
II See Appendix I for a sample demand letter drafted by the staff attorneys for the 
National Consumer Law Center. 
S G.L., c. 93A, §9(8). 
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was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered by the peti-
tion~r, the relief in the action will be limited to the settlement previ-
ously tendered by the respondent and refused by the petitioner. In the 
event that a settlement is not tendered or is refused, court action 
becomes necessary. 
In the event that court action is necessary, a complaint must of 
course be filed. A sample complaint can be found in Appendix II of 
this chapter. There are a few portions of this complaint which are 
worthy ·of special consideration. 
The sample complaint lists Suffolk County as the place of filing. 
However, Section 9 of Chapter 9SA does not provide any venue require-
ments. Venue, under Section 4 is established as where the defendant 
lives or has his usual place of business. Section 4, however, deals with 
actions to be instituted by the attorney general and not with private 
actions. It would thus seem that, by omission of mention the proceed-
ings may well be properly termed "transitory" and thus would be com-
menceable in either petitioner's or respondent's county.7 The safest 
procedure would seem to be to institute action in respondent's county 
and thus avoid any additional controversy. 
'The case name in the sample complaint, as may be noted, reads: 
"Mary Consumer [for herself and all others similarly situated]." This 
is a dual purpose heading. If the action is a class action, the bracketed 
portion is added after the name or names of the primary, representative 
petitioner and no brackets are used. If the action is not a class action, 
only the name or names of the petitioner (or petitioners) are used. The 
bracketed portion is then omitted entirely. It should be noted that 
only one respondent is listed in the sample. Whether or not several 
respondents can be joined as a class in a Section 9 action is uncertain. 
Section 9 itself is silent as to class respondents and until a test case 
is brought, there can be no certainty. 
Another point is the statement of the relief' for which petitioner 
prays. The bracketed section here includes injunctive relief. This 
stresses that, in addition to damages for past acts, the petitioner may 
request· affirmative action by the court of equity under Section 9 to 
prevent the continuance of the unfair practices. 
Number three of the representations is to be used only if the action 
is a class action. If it is not, number three is omitted in its entirety. 
Representation number. five should give a detailed account of the 
act which has precipitated the action. This act may well be one of 
those noted previously as being unlawful either under Section 2 itself 
or under a rule or regulation issued by the attorney general pursuant 
to Section 2(C).8 Certainly any act listed as already having been ruled 
unlawful is preferable, although an act analogous to those listed or a 
totally new unfair practice may certainly be pleaded. 
Also under number five, after quoting the text, the complaint should 
76 Mass. Practice Series §§11l-1I9. 
8 See §8.2 supra. 
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state that the use of the practice was knowing and willful. This will 
establish liability for double or treble damages. 
Representation number six, is, as was number three, applicable 
only if the action is a class action. Number seven deals with the 
demand for relief. This is not required if the respondent is not a 
resident of Massachusetts.9 It is probably best not to include the fact 
that respondent had made a written tender of settlement within SO 
days which was refused as unreasonable. However, if this was a bad 
faith offer, respondent's liability for double or treble damages can be 
established by including the bracketed portion of number seven. Sec-
tion 9 seems to require a refusal by respondent and not simply a 
failure to respond. 
Representation eight includes the prayers for relief. Number one 
thereunder requests a temporary restraining order. While Section 9 
does not provide for this remedy, it is inherent in the powers of equity 
courts and thus should be obtainable. Number five under representa-
tion eight requests actual damages. Section 9(3) seems to indicate that 
if respondent does not reply to a demand, even if the petitioner suffers 
no damages, provided there is a technical violation of Sections 2 or 2(c), 
petitioner may recover $25, or double or treble this amount under the 
specified circumstances.1o This, of course, is valuable in private en-
forcement, especially in a class action. Relief prayer number six is 
for attorney's fees and costs. This should always be included since 
the probability of recovery for these expenses is not foreclosed for a 
violation of Section 2(c). Finally, it is necessary to swear and subscribe 
the complaint if restraining orders are being requested. 
§8.5. Damages and other relief. If the court finds for the peti-
tioner where no written tender of settlement has been made by 
respondent or where that tender was unreasonable, recovery will be the 
amount of damages actually suffered or $25, whichever amount is 
greater. This is only for unintentional violations of the Act.1 For will-
ful or knowing violations of the Act or a bad faith refusal to tender 
settlement upon demand, with knowledge or reason to know that the 
act or practice complained of violated Section 2, the court may award 
up to three but not less than two times the amount which would be 
awarded for an unint~ntional violation.2 Any act or practice specifically 
covered by the provisions of Section 2 or Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act or the rules and regulations promulgated by 
the attorney general should provide "reason to know" that the act or 
practice was a violation of the Act. It would therefore follow that a 
refusal to tender settlement upon demand for an act or practice covered 
would provide the basis for petitioner to recover double to treble 
damages, if successful in proving his allegations. Although it is desir-
able hom the consumer's viewpoint, it is up to the courts to determine 
whether or not a patently unreasonable tender of settlement will be 
9 G.L., c. 9l1A, §9(ll). 
10 See §8.5 infra. 
§8.5. 1 G.L., c. 9llA, §9(ll). 
2 Ibid. 
7
Boston College Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Chapter 8: Consumer Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
16* 1969 ANNU4L SURVEY OF MASS,ACHUSETIS LAW §8.6 
treated as if no tender ~l'e made. The Act does not give any indica-
tion as to this point. 
Tll4, demand requirements of Section 3 do not apply to prospective 
l'~pondents who do not maintain a place of business within the Com-
monwealth or who do not keep assets within the Commonwealth.s 
However. the nonresident respondent may voluntarily employ the 
tender provisions of Section 9, by making a written offer of relief as 
soon as practicable after receiving notice of an action commenced 
under Section 9.' The nonresident respondent may limit damages to 
the ~ount of the tender, if refused ,by petitioner, by paying that 
tender into court. This limitation, as with resident respondents, inures 
only if the tender is reasonable in relation to the damages as deter-
mined. 
The court, upon proper application, may award such other equi-
table relief, including an injunction, as it deems necessary and proper 
under the circumstances of the case,!1 If the court finds that there 
has been, a violation of Section 2, the petitioner will be awarded rea-
sonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the suit, 
irrespective of the amount in ,controversy.6 However, in order to 
encourage reasonable settlements" the court will not award attorney's 
fees or costs in a case where the petitioner has rejected a reasonable 
tender of settlement made in due time as required by Section 9(3).'1 
C. ,PUBLIC REMEDIES 
§8.6. Initiation of legal action by the attorney general: Investiga. 
dons. ,Where the attorney general has reason to believe! that a person 
is us~g or is about, tq use any method, !lct or practice declared unlaw-
ful lln4e:r, Section 2 of the Act and not exempted by Section 3 and 
that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may conduct an 
investigation2 as to the w,ethod, act or practice in question, and if the 
s~tuation merits. he may bring an action in the name of the Com-
mOI\wea1~.8 
TheAJ-ttorn.ey general is authorized by Section 6(1) to conduct such 
an iI\v~stigation to ~«;ertain whethe,r the p~rson complained of is in 
fact engaging in a method, act or practice which violates the Act. The 
8 Ibid. 
4 ibid. 
II C.L., c. 98A, §9(1}." 
• C.L., c. 9.5A, §9(4}. 
'1 See §8.4 s,uFa. 
§8.5. lQ.L. c. 95.1\. §4. InfGrma~ion as to a possib.e ,vio~tion of the Act lJllI.y come 
from any ,ource. Section 4 creates a du~y in any district attorney or law enforcement 
oflker who receives notice of a violation'to immediately notify the attorney general 
in writing, of . that violation. Section 10 requires the clerk of court to inform the 
attorney general of any private proceedings under the Act. 
2 C.L., c. 93A, §6(1}. 
8 G,L .• t. 9M. §4. 
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investigation must comply with the standards set out in the Act as 
to notice4 and service of notice. I) The Act provides for safeguards as 
to material received6 and for extensions of time for compliance~"1 It 
also has a provision limiting the material which must be provided 
for inspection.s A civil penalty of up to $5000 is asses.sable far failure 
to comply with the investigation proceeding.9 
If the situation warrants legal proceedings to restrain the use of the 
method, act or practice complained of, the Attorney General is au-
thorized to bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth.10 The 
attorney general must notify the prospective respondent of his intended 
action at least ten days prior to its commencement. The respective 
respondent must be given an opportunity to confer with the attorney 
general concerning the proposed action, either in person or through 
counsel.11 
Upon deciding to initiate legal proceedings, the attorney general may 
bring the action in the county where the respondent resides or has his 
principal place of business. By consent of the parties or if the respon-
dent has no place of business within the Commonwealth, the action 
may be brought in the superior court of Suffolk CountyY~ 
The court, in a suit brought by the attorney general under the Act, 
may issue temporary or permanent injunctions and other orders or 
jUdgments as may be necessary to do justice for the aggrieved con-
sumers.1S 
§8.7. Assurance of discontinuance of violation. In lieu of filing a 
legal action under Section 4 of the Act, the attorney general may ac-
cept an assurance of discontinuance from the person thought to bl! 
engaged in, or to have been engaged in a violative method, act or 
practice.1 This assurance must be in writing and must be filed with 
the Superior Court of Suffolk County. The assurance may be required 
to include a stipulation of an amount voluntarily placed in escrow 
pending any action by aggrieved consumers under Section 9, or an 
antount paid as restitution to the aggrieved consumers, or both. 
Evidence of a violation of an assurance of discontinuance is prima 
facie evidence of a violation of Section 2 in any subsequent proceeding 
brought by the attorney general.2 
§S.S. Penalties for violating an injunction. Section 4 of the Act 
4 G.L., c. gllA, §§6(2), 6(4). 
I) G.L., c. gllA, §6(lI). 
6 G.L., c. 9l1A, §§6(5), 6(6). 
"1 G.L., c. gllA, §6(7). 
S G.L., c. 9l1A, §6(5). 
9 G.L., c. gllA, §7. 
10 G.L., c. 9llA, §lO. 
11 See §S.7 infra. 
12 G.L., c. 9l1A, §4. 
18 Ibid. 
§8.7. 1 C.L., c. 9l1A, §5. 
I Ibid. 
9
Boston College Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Chapter 8: Consumer Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1969
166 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §8.9 
pJ;'ovides that any person who violates the terms of an injunction or 
other order issued under that section shall forfeit and pay to the Com-
monwealth a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. 
The attorney general, under Section 8, may petition the court to order 
the dissolution, suspension, or forfeiture of the franchise of any do-
mestic corporation, or the right of any foreign corporation to do 
business. in the Commonwealth, whenever he finds that the corporation 
has habitually violated the terms of a Section 4 injunction. 
§8.9. Summation. In all, the Massachusetts General Court has 
provided the consumer with one of the most powerful weapons ever 
created for him. Exactly how powerful it is will be determined by the 
interpretation and applications of the courts of the Commonwealth. 
Exactly how effective it is will be determined by the awareness of its 
existence by the general public and by the willingness of that public 
and its attorneys to enforce the rights granted thereunder. Often the 
actualloS/l in these actions is minimal, thus the tendency is to forgive 
the trespass. However, when all of the consumers who have been 
trespassed against are considered, the result is many trespasses resulting 
in cumulatively large mo~etary damages. Perhaps the class action, 
included herein by the General Court, is the answer. Such an action 
might be financially reasonable to the consumer and his attorney and 
thus foster a better enforcement of the rights granted. In any event, 
the attorney who would advise his client to forget a small claim under 
this Act might do well to remember that he too is a consumer. If this 
Act is successfully enforced by the courts, by the public and by the 
attorney general, the result could be a great overall saving for the 
populace in general. The seller is unlikely to be unfair if the odds of 
punishment are high. 
Massachusetts, along with North Carolina, is the testing ground of 
this new concept, this tool for the consumer. If Chapter gSA succeeds 
in eliminating unfair practices, it may well be followed across the 
United States, thus making the lot of the consumer more equitable. 
If Chapter gSA fails, it will be written off as just another noble ex-
periment which has failed. 
APPENDIX 1 
THIRTY-DAY WRITTEN DEMAND FOR RELIEF 
Dear ___ _ 
Under the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter gSA, 
Section 9(1), I (name and address of claimant), hereby make written 
demand for relief as outlined in that statute. 
On or about (date and reasonable description of the unfair or decep-
tive act relied upon). This unfair or deceptive act or practice is, in 
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my opinion, an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared unlawful 
by Section 2 of Chapter 9SA (or legal rule or regulation issued under 
Section 2(c) of chapter 9SA) which reads as follows: 
[Quote text of section.] 
As a result of information available to me and in my belief, this 
unfair or deceptive act or practice has been used or employed in regard 
to others. 
Therefore, I hereby demand the following relief: 
[Indicate relief sought.] 
APPENDIX II 
Sincerely, 
(signature) 
Name of Claimant 
By his attorney: 
SAMPLE PLEADINGS UNDER CHAPTER 93A, SECTION 9 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Suffolk, SSl 
Superior Court 
Number --
MARY CONSUMER [for herself and all 
others similarly situated]2 
v. 
DEFRAUDING MERCHANTS COMPANYs 
BILL IN EQUITY FOR DAMAGES [AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF]' 
Respectfully represents your petitioner(s): 
1. This is an action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 9SA, as amended. 
1 Section 9 does not establish venue requirements. Section 4 establishes venue as 
where the defendant lives or has his usual place of business, but the attorney 
general is responsible for instituting actions under this section. While proceedings 
under §9 could properly be classified as transitory and thus suit could be com· 
menced in either petitioner's or respondent's county, it would be the best procedure 
to file in respondent's county. See §8.4 supra. 
2 If brought as a class action. 
s Section 9 is silent as to whether several respondents can be joined as a class. 
, Both monetary damage. and injunctive relief can be sought under 89. 
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2. Petitiorutr, Mary Consumer, is a natural person and a resident of 
Boston, CoUllty of· Suffolk, ·Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and 
purchased (or leased) goods (or services) primarily for personal, family 
or household purposes and thereby has suffered monetary (or property, 
real or personal) loss all a result of the' employment (or use) by the 
ddeOOJnt(s) of an unfair or deceptive /lCt or practice declal!ed unlawful 
by Mass .. (if:n. 'Laws ch. 93A, Section 2 (or by rule [or regulation] issued 
under Mass. -Gen. Laws ch. 93A Section 2(c» as will appear in greater 
detail below. 
3. Petitioner brings this action on behalf of herself and all other 
persons similarly injured by the employment (or use) of the unfair 
or deceptive! act' or practice since petitioner adequately and fairly 
represents such other persons as will appear in greater detail below. II 
4. The respondent, Defrauding Merchants Company, is a corpora-
tion establi~ed and existing under the laws of this Commonwealth 
and having its usual place of business in said Boston. 
5. That on or about November 20, 1969, the respondent, Defraud-
ing Merchants Company, through its agent, servant, or employee, John 
Smith, [describe in detail the factual occurrence complained Of].6 The 
employment (or use) of this act or practice has been declared unlawful 
by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, Section 2 (or by rule or regulation issued 
under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 9SA, Section 2(c», which provides: 
[Quote the text.] 
That respondent'$ employment (or use) of the said act or practice 
was wilHully or knowingly dope in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
93A, Secwm 2. 
6. That'ipn information to and belief by the petitioner, for an 
unknown period of time prior to and subsequent to November 20, 
1969, the said rc:spondent, thrQpgb its agents, servants, or employees 
employed (or used) similar aps or practices In regard to numerous 
other persons unnamed and unknown to petitioner who are too 
numerous to permit joinder but who are adequately and fairly rep-
resented by the petition~r.T. . 
7. That on or about November 25, 1969, the petitioner sent to the 
respondent ~y re~~e~4. mail, a written demand for relief, identifying 
the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or 
practice relied upon and the injury ruffered. A true copy of this written 
demand attached hereto,_ ma;r:ked Exhibit "A," alld by this reference 
incorporatoo herein:s ["Respondent did not reply to petitioner's 
II If broucJ1t .. a cllll action. 
• &Ie 88.2· mlm' for • sampUng' of.thoae activities declared unlawful by §2 itself 
lUld by J'UIe or regQlation iuoed UDder §%(c). 
T If brought .... clua 'action. 
S A demand i. not required if respondent i. out of state. See Section 9(5). It is 
probably better practice not to include the fact that respondent made a written 
tender of ~U1=.at withia 10 days. Hqwever,one can establish respondent'. Hability 
for treble or do\lbJe dam ... by iadudiJlc the quote cited in the text. ,While Section 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/11
§8.8 CONSUMER. PROTECI'ION 169 
demand (or "refused to grant petitioner's demand for relief") and this 
failure and refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith 
with knowledge or'reason to know that the act or practice col'nplain~d 
of violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 9SA, Section 2."] 
8. That as a result of the unfair or deceptive practices employed 
(or used) by the said respondent the petitioner and those persons 
similarly situated which petitioner represents have suffered monetary 
(or property, real or personal) losses in that (describe the losses fully). 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays: 
I. That the respondent, its agents, servants, and employees be 
temporarily restrained and enjoined from (describe respondent's un-
lawful conduct).9 
2. That the Honorable Court conduct a preliminary hearing and 
determine: 
(a) Petitioner adequately and fairly represents the numerous other 
persons damaged in a similar way monetarily (or to their property, real 
or personal) by the employment of the unfair or deceptive act or 
practice. 
(b) That the most effective practical manner to give notice of this 
action to the said numerous other unnamed petitioners is to require 
the said respondent to furnish forthwith to this Court lists of names 
of those persons who have been subjected by the respondent to the 
said unfair or deceptive act or practice. 
S. That this Honorable Court require the said respondent to 
furnish forthwith to this Court lists of names of those persons who 
have been subjected by the respondent to the said unfair or deceptive 
act or practice and that this Court arrange to notify said persons of 
this action. 
4. That the respondent, its agents, servants, and employees lie 
perpetually enjoined from (describe respondent's unlawful conduct). 
5. That the damages actually caused to the petitioner be estab-
lished10 and that an execution issue for triple the established amount 
thereon since "the respondent's employment (or use) of the said act 
or practice was willfully or knowingly done in violation of Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 9SA, Section 2" (or "respondent did not reply to petitioner's 
9 appears to require refusal rather than failure to respond by the respondent, it is 
open to this latter interpretation. Where respondent makes a written tender of 
settlement rejected by a petitioner, and the tender is later determined by a court 
to be "reasonable in relation to the injury suffered, recovery is limited to that 
amount." 
9 Although §9 does not mention temporary restraining orders, an equity court'. 
jurisdiction inherently includes the power. 
10 Section 9(5) seems to indicate that if respondent does not reply to a demand, 
even if petitioner suffers no damages, but there is a technical violation of §§2 and 
2(c), petitioner may recover $25 (or treble or double this sum under certain circum-
stances). This, of course, is a valuable private enforcement too, especially if brought 
as a class action. 
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demand (ot refused to grant petitioner's demand for relief) and this 
failure and refusal to grant relief. upon demand was made in bad 
faith with· knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice 
complained of violated Mass. Gen. LawS' ch. 93A, Section 2.") 
6. That the petitioner be awarded reasonable attorneys fees for 
and costs of this action.11 
7. And for such other and equitable relief that this Honorable 
Court may deem equitable and just. 
Sworn and subscribed to under the pains and penalties of perjury 
this second day of January, 1970.12 
Mary Consumer 
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER 
By the Clerk of this Honorable Court. 
, 11 Include in all cases since Section 9 does not forclose this possibility for a 
violation of Section 2(c). . 
12 Required when requesting restraining orders. 
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